- Go service with its own multi-stage Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml; runs as container webrestrict-control on port 8791. - SQLite schema for the full AGENTS.md §7 data model via versioned migrations (PRAGMA user_version); audit log is append-only. - Configuration from the process environment; the real env file is gitignored and a template is committed. No secrets in the repo. - Separate session login (signed HMAC cookie + CSRF) for Sam. - GET /health; HTMX + server-rendered dashboard styled with the Family Home Lab tokens.css (copied) and Inter fonts; dark mode; phone-friendly. - Caddy vhost for webrestrict.lab.audasmedia.com.au applied on .35 (Let's Encrypt cert issued); route recorded in deploy/caddy/webrestrict.caddy. - Unit tests for config, auth and store. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
113 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
113 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func testManager(t *testing.T) *Manager {
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t.Helper()
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m, err := New([]byte("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"), time.Hour, false, "sam", "", "hunter2")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
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}
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return m
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}
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func TestCredentials(t *testing.T) {
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m := testManager(t)
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if !m.CheckCredentials("sam", "hunter2") {
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t.Error("valid credentials rejected")
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}
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if m.CheckCredentials("sam", "wrong") {
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t.Error("wrong password accepted")
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}
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if m.CheckCredentials("finn", "hunter2") {
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t.Error("wrong username accepted")
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}
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}
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func TestSessionRoundTripAndTamper(t *testing.T) {
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m := testManager(t)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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m.Issue(rec)
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res := rec.Result()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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for _, c := range res.Cookies() {
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req.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if !m.Authenticated(req) {
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t.Fatal("issued session is not authenticated")
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}
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// Tamper with the session value: the HMAC must reject it.
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tampered := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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for _, c := range res.Cookies() {
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if c.Name == sessionCookie {
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c.Value = c.Value[:len(c.Value)-2] + "xx"
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}
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tampered.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if m.Authenticated(tampered) {
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t.Fatal("tampered session accepted")
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}
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}
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func TestCSRF(t *testing.T) {
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m := testManager(t)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/login", nil)
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token := m.EnsureCSRF(rec, req)
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if token == "" {
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t.Fatal("empty csrf token")
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}
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// The token is delivered as a cookie; a matching form value passes.
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form := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
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form.PostForm = map[string][]string{"csrf": {token}}
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for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
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form.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if !m.CheckCSRF(form) {
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t.Error("matching csrf rejected")
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}
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// A different form value fails.
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bad := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
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bad.PostForm = map[string][]string{"csrf": {"not-the-token"}}
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for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
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bad.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if m.CheckCSRF(bad) {
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t.Error("mismatched csrf accepted")
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}
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// No cookie at all fails.
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none := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
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none.PostForm = map[string][]string{"csrf": {token}}
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if m.CheckCSRF(none) {
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t.Error("csrf accepted without cookie")
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}
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}
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func TestExpiredSession(t *testing.T) {
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m, err := New([]byte("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"), -time.Minute, false, "sam", "", "hunter2")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
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}
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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m.Issue(rec)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
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req.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if m.Authenticated(req) {
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t.Error("expired session accepted")
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}
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}
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