Files
internet_use_control/deploy/mosquitto/tls/README.md
Sam Rolfe 14b304e0b0 Phase 3: MQTT transport — retained config, status/telemetry, LWT presence, TLS/ACL design
- internal/mqtt: publish each device's desired state retained on
  restrict/<device>/config; subscribe to restrict/+/status and
  restrict/+/telemetry and write reports to SQLite; publish on every state
  change, republish on connect and every 15 minutes from SQLite, so the broker
  is repaired from the source of truth.
- store: presence (devices.online and last_seen, audited only on transitions),
  telemetry upsert per (device, day, app, domain) via migration 002, allow and
  block lists read into the config payload, device lookup by topic.
- config: MQTT settings. TLS plus per-device credentials are required; the
  pre-TLS shared broker needs an explicit CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE escape hatch.
- web: republish config after lock, unlock, expiry, create and edit; broker card
  on the status partial.
- deploy/mosquitto: TLS listener, topic ACL, credential provisioning and a
  verifier that proves the policy on a throwaway broker. Not applied to the
  shared Mosquitto on .13 — that change needs Sam's approval.
- cmd/control: mqtt-clients prints the MQTT identity of every device.
- paho.mqtt.golang v1.5.1, which pulls golang.org/x/net and with it the
  golang.org/x/crypto bump to v0.42.0.

Verified on .13: retained config delivered to a fresh subscriber; a client
killed without DISCONNECT drove the broker's retained will and the service
flipped the device offline; telemetry landed in SQLite; make mqtt-verify passed
13/13; the service connected over TLS with credentials and a CA.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 14:37:43 +11:00

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Markdown

# The lab CA and broker certificate
`generate-tls.sh` writes the certificate material here:
| File | Purpose | Who gets it |
|---|---|---|
| `ca.crt` | the lab CA certificate | every device and the Control Service |
| `ca.key` | the CA private key | **not** a device; keep it off-device |
| `server.crt` | the broker certificate | the broker |
| `server.key` | the broker private key | the broker |
Everything in this directory except this README is gitignored: certificates and
keys are generated per host and never committed.
```bash
make mqtt-tls # writes the four files (skips them if they exist)
make mqtt-tls-force # use generate-tls.sh --force to replace them
```
The broker runs as user `mosquitto` (uid 1883) inside its container, and this
directory is bind-mounted read-only, so the files are created mode **0644**. That
makes the private keys readable on `.13` by any local user. It is the pragmatic
choice for a LAN-only broker whose key must be readable by a container user that
does not exist on the host. Replace it with a group-mapped setup if `.13` ever
gets untrusted local users.