Build on Phases 1–7. Adds the two override paths from AGENTS.md §4 FR-10/FR-11: the shared device keycode and the versioned admin HTTP API the separate Kotlin admin app will call. - store: migration 004 adds state.grant_until and a settings table. New overrides.go records every override in `overrides` and verifies the shared keycode (bcrypt; one code for every device, §10 rule 3). ExpireLocks also clears an expired grant, and NextScheduleBoundary includes the grant end so a device re-locks on time. - effective state: a grant unlocks a device inside a schedule window; a manual lock clears a grant and a grant clears a manual lock. The retained config payload gains grant_until (additive, v stays 1). - web: /api/v1/admin/... (list, state, lock, unlock, grant) guarded by CONTROL_ADMIN_API_TOKEN, separate from the session login, plus the on-device keycode endpoint POST /api/v1/device/override with per-address throttling. A state change is published retained before the API responds. - cmd/control: `keycode` subcommand and start-up seeding from CONTROL_DEVICE_KEYCODE_HASH. - deploy/verify-phase8.sh + `make verify-phase8` prove the definition of done: an API lock reaches a real broker subscriber in well under a second. - Version 0.6.0-phase8 (compose, Makefile, docs). Measured on .13: the lock reached the TLS broker subscriber in 7 ms (handler 1 ms, request to retained publish accepted). Tests: go vet ./... and go test -count=1 ./... pass in golang:1.25-alpine. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
479 lines
14 KiB
Go
479 lines
14 KiB
Go
// Command control is the Internet Use Control Control Service.
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//
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// It is the single source of truth for the family's device rules
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// (SYSTEM_MAP.md). Phase 3: publishes each device's desired state to the broker,
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// retained, and consumes device presence and telemetry reports from it.
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package main
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"math/big"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"os/signal"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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"gitea.lab.audasmedia.com.au/sam/internet_use_control/internal/auth"
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"gitea.lab.audasmedia.com.au/sam/internet_use_control/internal/config"
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"gitea.lab.audasmedia.com.au/sam/internet_use_control/internal/mqtt"
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"gitea.lab.audasmedia.com.au/sam/internet_use_control/internal/store"
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"gitea.lab.audasmedia.com.au/sam/internet_use_control/internal/web"
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)
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// version is injected with -ldflags at build time.
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var version = "dev"
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// republishInterval is how often the retained config is refreshed from SQLite.
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// The broker is transport, not storage: if its retained store is ever lost, the
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// service repairs it from the database without a restart.
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const republishInterval = 15 * time.Minute
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// republishPoll is how often the loop re-evaluates the next schedule boundary.
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// It bounds how late a transition can be after the schedule is edited, and it
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// keeps the service from sleeping past a boundary that did not exist yet when
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// the loop last looked.
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const republishPoll = 30 * time.Second
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// Maintenance (Phase 7): the daily usage rollup is rebuilt periodically so it
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// is repaired from the detail table, and the append-only audit log is capped so
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// it cannot grow without bound (AGENTS.md §7 retention).
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const (
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maintenanceInterval = 15 * time.Minute
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auditMaxRows = 20000
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)
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func main() {
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if len(os.Args) > 1 {
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switch os.Args[1] {
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case "hash-password":
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hashPassword(os.Args[2:])
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return
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case "mqtt-clients":
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mqttClients(os.Args[2:])
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return
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case "keycode":
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keycode(os.Args[2:])
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return
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case "rollup":
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rollup(os.Args[2:])
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return
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case "version":
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fmt.Println(version)
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return
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}
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}
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if err := run(); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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}
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func run() error {
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started := time.Now()
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cfg, err := config.Load()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cfg.Version = version
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log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: cfg.LogLevel}))
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slog.SetDefault(log)
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st, err := store.Open(cfg.DBPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer st.Close()
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if err := st.Migrate(context.Background()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Backfill the daily rollup from any telemetry written before Phase 7, then
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// cap the audit log. Both are idempotent.
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if n, err := st.RebuildRollups(context.Background()); err != nil {
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return err
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} else if n > 0 {
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log.Info("usage rollups rebuilt", "rows", n)
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}
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if n, err := st.CapAudit(context.Background(), auditMaxRows); err != nil {
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log.Error("audit cap", "err", err)
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} else if n > 0 {
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log.Info("audit log capped", "removed", n, "max", auditMaxRows)
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}
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// Phase 8: seed the shared device keycode from environment.d. The stored
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// value is the runtime copy that `control keycode` can change; the
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// environment is the deploy-time source. A malformed hash stops start-up
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// rather than silently disabling the keycode path.
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if seeded, err := st.SeedKeycodeHash(context.Background(), cfg.DeviceKeycodeHash); err != nil {
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return err
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} else if seeded {
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log.Info("device keycode seeded from CONTROL_DEVICE_KEYCODE_HASH")
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}
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am, err := auth.New(cfg.SessionSecret, cfg.SessionTTL, cfg.CookieSecure,
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cfg.AdminUsername, cfg.AdminPasswordHash, cfg.AdminPassword)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !am.Hashed() {
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log.Warn("admin password is plaintext; set CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH to use bcrypt")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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defer cancel()
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go maintenanceLoop(ctx, log, st)
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// The broker link (Phase 3). It is optional on purpose: the dashboard must
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// keep working while the broker is down, and the device keeps its last state
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// (AGENTS.md §10 rule 2).
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var (
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link *mqtt.Link
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pub web.Publisher
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)
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if cfg.MQTTEnabled {
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link, err = mqtt.New(mqtt.Options{
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Broker: cfg.MQTTBroker,
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ClientID: cfg.MQTTClientID,
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Username: cfg.MQTTUsername,
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Password: cfg.MQTTPassword,
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CAFile: cfg.MQTTCAFile,
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Actor: "device",
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Location: cfg.ScheduleLocation,
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Log: log,
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Devices: st,
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Source: st,
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Reports: st,
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OnConnected: func() { republish(ctx, log, link, st) },
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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pub = link
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link.Start(ctx)
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defer link.Stop()
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go republishLoop(ctx, log, link, st, cfg.ScheduleLocation)
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if !cfg.MQTTTLS() {
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log.Warn("mqtt is running without TLS; the shared broker has no TLS listener yet (AGENTS.md §10 rule 6)",
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"broker", cfg.MQTTBroker)
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}
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} else {
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log.Warn("mqtt is disabled; device config stays in SQLite and is not published")
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}
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srv, err := web.New(cfg, st, am, log, pub)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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httpServer := &http.Server{
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Addr: cfg.Addr,
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Handler: srv.Handler(),
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ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
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ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
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WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
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IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
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}
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errCh := make(chan error, 1)
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go func() {
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log.Info("control service listening",
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"addr", cfg.Addr, "db", cfg.DBPath, "env", cfg.AppEnv, "version", version)
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if err := httpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
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errCh <- err
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}
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}()
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stop := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
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signal.Notify(stop, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
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select {
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case err := <-errCh:
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return err
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case sig := <-stop:
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log.Info("shutting down", "signal", sig.String())
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}
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cancel()
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ctxShutdown, cancelShutdown := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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defer cancelShutdown()
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if err := httpServer.Shutdown(ctxShutdown); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("shutdown: %w", err)
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}
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log.Info("stopped", "uptime", time.Since(started).Round(time.Second).String())
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return nil
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}
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// republish pushes every device's retained config. It runs once per connect and
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// whenever the desired state may have changed, so the broker's view is rebuilt
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// from SQLite, the source of truth. It first clears any manual lock that has
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// expired, so the published state is never stale.
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func republish(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, link *mqtt.Link, st *store.Store) {
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if link == nil {
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return
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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if n, err := st.ExpireLocks(ctx); err != nil {
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log.Error("expire locks", "err", err)
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} else if n > 0 {
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log.Info("expired timed locks", "count", n)
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}
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n, err := link.PublishAll(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Error("mqtt publish all", "published", n, "err", err)
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return
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}
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log.Info("mqtt retained config refreshed", "devices", n)
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}
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// republishLoop refreshes the retained config when a schedule boundary is
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// crossed and otherwise on a long interval. It re-evaluates often instead of
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// sleeping until one computed boundary, so a schedule edited after the loop
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// started still turns on and off on time (FR-2) without a poll from the device.
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func republishLoop(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, link *mqtt.Link, st *store.Store, loc *time.Location) {
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if loc == nil {
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loc = time.Local
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}
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lastEval := time.Now()
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lastPublish := lastEval
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for {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return
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case <-time.After(republishPoll):
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}
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if !link.Connected() {
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lastEval = time.Now()
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continue
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}
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now := time.Now()
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shouldPublish := !now.Before(lastPublish.Add(republishInterval))
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// A boundary between the last evaluation and now has been crossed.
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if boundary, err := st.NextScheduleBoundary(ctx, lastEval.In(loc)); err != nil {
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log.Error("next schedule boundary", "err", err)
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} else if boundary != nil && !boundary.After(now) {
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shouldPublish = true
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}
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if shouldPublish {
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republish(ctx, log, link, st)
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lastPublish = time.Now()
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}
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lastEval = now
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}
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}
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// maintenanceLoop keeps derived data healthy without blocking the service: it
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// rebuilds the daily rollups and caps the audit log on a fixed interval.
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func maintenanceLoop(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, st *store.Store) {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(maintenanceInterval)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return
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case <-ticker.C:
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runMaintenance(ctx, log, st)
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}
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}
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}
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func runMaintenance(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, st *store.Store) {
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mctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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if n, err := st.RebuildRollups(mctx); err != nil {
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log.Error("usage rollups", "err", err)
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} else if n > 0 {
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log.Debug("usage rollups rebuilt", "rows", n)
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}
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if n, err := st.CapAudit(mctx, auditMaxRows); err != nil {
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log.Error("audit cap", "err", err)
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} else if n > 0 {
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log.Info("audit log capped", "removed", n, "max", auditMaxRows)
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}
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}
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// rollup rebuilds the daily usage rollup from the telemetry detail table. It is
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// idempotent and safe to run while the service is up; it exits non-zero on a
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// failure so a script can tell.
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func rollup(args []string) {
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dbPath := env("CONTROL_DB_PATH", "/data/control.db")
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for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
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if (args[i] == "--db" || args[i] == "-db") && i+1 < len(args) {
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dbPath = args[i+1]
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i++
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}
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}
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st, err := store.Open(dbPath)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer st.Close()
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if err := st.Migrate(context.Background()); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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n, err := st.RebuildRollups(context.Background())
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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fmt.Printf("rebuilt %d daily rollup rows from %s\n", n, dbPath)
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}
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// mqttClients prints the MQTT identity of every registered device, one device
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// per line, as tab-separated fields:
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//
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// <token>\t<config topic>\t<platform>\t<child>\t<name>
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//
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// provision-clients.sh uses it to create one broker account per device. Real
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// tabs, not padded columns: names contain spaces, so a space-separated field
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// would not be safe to parse. The token is the MQTT username and the middle
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// level of the device's topics (deploy/mosquitto/README.md). It is not a secret
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// and this never prints one.
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func mqttClients(args []string) {
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dbPath := env("CONTROL_DB_PATH", "/data/control.db")
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for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
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if (args[i] == "--db" || args[i] == "-db") && i+1 < len(args) {
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dbPath = args[i+1]
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i++
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}
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}
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st, err := store.Open(dbPath)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer st.Close()
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devices, err := st.ListDevices(context.Background())
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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for _, dev := range devices {
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token := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(dev.Topic, mqtt.TopicPrefix+"/"), mqtt.SuffixConfig)
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fmt.Printf("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", token, dev.Topic, dev.Platform, dev.Child, dev.Name)
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}
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}
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func env(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key)); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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// keycode sets the shared device keycode (AGENTS.md §10 rule 3). It reads the
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// code from a positional argument or stdin, or generates a random six-digit
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// code with --generate, and stores only its bcrypt hash in SQLite. The code
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// itself is printed once, and only when it was generated here, so it can be set
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// on each device; it is never logged by the running service.
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func keycode(args []string) {
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dbPath := env("CONTROL_DB_PATH", "/data/control.db")
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generate := false
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code := ""
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for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
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switch args[i] {
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case "--db", "-db":
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if i+1 < len(args) {
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dbPath = args[i+1]
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i++
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}
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case "--generate", "-generate":
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generate = true
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default:
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if code == "" {
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code = args[i]
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}
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}
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}
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if generate {
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n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000000))
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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code = fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n.Int64())
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} else if code == "" {
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b, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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code = strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
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}
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if len(code) < 4 || len(code) > 64 {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control: keycode must be 4 to 64 characters")
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os.Exit(2)
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}
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st, err := store.Open(dbPath)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer st.Close()
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if err := st.Migrate(context.Background()); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(code), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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if err := st.SetKeycodeHash(context.Background(), string(hash), "admin"); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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if generate {
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fmt.Printf("device keycode set: %s\n", code)
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return
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}
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fmt.Println("device keycode updated")
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}
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// hashPassword prints a bcrypt hash for the password given as an argument or
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// read from stdin. It never prints the password itself.
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func hashPassword(args []string) {
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var password string
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if len(args) > 0 {
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password = args[0]
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} else {
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b, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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password = strings.TrimRight(string(b), "\r\n")
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}
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if password == "" {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control: empty password")
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os.Exit(2)
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}
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hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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fmt.Println(string(hash))
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|
}
|