Files
internet_use_control/environment.d/control-service.env.example
Sam Rolfe 14b304e0b0 Phase 3: MQTT transport — retained config, status/telemetry, LWT presence, TLS/ACL design
- internal/mqtt: publish each device's desired state retained on
  restrict/<device>/config; subscribe to restrict/+/status and
  restrict/+/telemetry and write reports to SQLite; publish on every state
  change, republish on connect and every 15 minutes from SQLite, so the broker
  is repaired from the source of truth.
- store: presence (devices.online and last_seen, audited only on transitions),
  telemetry upsert per (device, day, app, domain) via migration 002, allow and
  block lists read into the config payload, device lookup by topic.
- config: MQTT settings. TLS plus per-device credentials are required; the
  pre-TLS shared broker needs an explicit CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE escape hatch.
- web: republish config after lock, unlock, expiry, create and edit; broker card
  on the status partial.
- deploy/mosquitto: TLS listener, topic ACL, credential provisioning and a
  verifier that proves the policy on a throwaway broker. Not applied to the
  shared Mosquitto on .13 — that change needs Sam's approval.
- cmd/control: mqtt-clients prints the MQTT identity of every device.
- paho.mqtt.golang v1.5.1, which pulls golang.org/x/net and with it the
  golang.org/x/crypto bump to v0.42.0.

Verified on .13: retained config delivered to a fresh subscriber; a client
killed without DISCONNECT drove the broker's retained will and the service
flipped the device offline; telemetry landed in SQLite; make mqtt-verify passed
13/13; the service connected over TLS with credentials and a CA.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 14:37:43 +11:00

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# Control Service configuration — template.
#
# Copy to control-service.env and fill in real values. The real file is
# gitignored and must never be committed. docker compose loads it with env_file.
#
# Secrets in this lab also live in ~/.config/environment.d/10-secrets.conf; the
# same variable names can be exported there instead. The service reads only the
# process environment, so either source works.
# Listen address inside the container.
CONTROL_ADDR=:8791
# SQLite database on the persistent volume.
CONTROL_DB_PATH=/data/control.db
CONTROL_APP_ENV=production
CONTROL_LOG_LEVEL=info
# Signs the session cookie. Set to a long random string (>= 16 chars).
# Generate: openssl rand -hex 32
CONTROL_SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
# Session lifetime (Go duration).
CONTROL_SESSION_TTL=12h
# Secure cookie flag. Keep true behind Caddy/HTTPS. Set false only for
# plain-HTTP local testing.
CONTROL_COOKIE_SECURE=true
# The single dashboard login (Sam).
CONTROL_ADMIN_USERNAME=sam
# Option A (simple): plaintext password. Constant-time compared at login.
CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
# Option B (preferred): a bcrypt hash; leave CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD empty.
# Generate: docker run --rm --entrypoint /app/control webrestrict/control:0.3.0-phase3 hash-password 'your-password'
# CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH=$2a$10$...
# --- MQTT (Phase 3) --------------------------------------------------------
# The broker is transport only. SQLite stays the source of truth, and only the
# Control Service publishes config (AGENTS.md §10 rules 5-6).
# Turn the broker link on or off. With it off the dashboard still works and the
# config stays in SQLite, unpublished.
CONTROL_MQTT_ENABLED=true
# The shared Mosquitto on `.13`, seen from inside this container. The compose
# file maps host.docker.internal to the host gateway.
# When the TLS listener exists, change this to tls://host.docker.internal:8883.
CONTROL_MQTT_BROKER=tcp://host.docker.internal:1883
# The Control Service identity. The broker ACL gives it write access to every
# config topic and read access to every status and telemetry topic, nothing else.
CONTROL_MQTT_CLIENT_ID=control-service
# CONTROL_MQTT_USERNAME=control-service
# CONTROL_MQTT_PASSWORD=change-me
# PEM bundle used to verify the broker certificate. Required for a tls:// broker.
CONTROL_MQTT_CA_FILE=/etc/webrestrict/tls/ca.crt
# TEMPORARY. The shared Mosquitto has no TLS listener yet, so a plaintext,
# credential-less link is allowed. The service refuses to start without
# credentials or TLS unless this is true, and it logs a warning when it is.
# Set to false as soon as deploy/mosquitto/ is applied (AGENTS.md §10 rule 6).
CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE=true