Files
internet_use_control/deploy/mosquitto/README.md
Sam Rolfe 14b304e0b0 Phase 3: MQTT transport — retained config, status/telemetry, LWT presence, TLS/ACL design
- internal/mqtt: publish each device's desired state retained on
  restrict/<device>/config; subscribe to restrict/+/status and
  restrict/+/telemetry and write reports to SQLite; publish on every state
  change, republish on connect and every 15 minutes from SQLite, so the broker
  is repaired from the source of truth.
- store: presence (devices.online and last_seen, audited only on transitions),
  telemetry upsert per (device, day, app, domain) via migration 002, allow and
  block lists read into the config payload, device lookup by topic.
- config: MQTT settings. TLS plus per-device credentials are required; the
  pre-TLS shared broker needs an explicit CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE escape hatch.
- web: republish config after lock, unlock, expiry, create and edit; broker card
  on the status partial.
- deploy/mosquitto: TLS listener, topic ACL, credential provisioning and a
  verifier that proves the policy on a throwaway broker. Not applied to the
  shared Mosquitto on .13 — that change needs Sam's approval.
- cmd/control: mqtt-clients prints the MQTT identity of every device.
- paho.mqtt.golang v1.5.1, which pulls golang.org/x/net and with it the
  golang.org/x/crypto bump to v0.42.0.

Verified on .13: retained config delivered to a fresh subscriber; a client
killed without DISCONNECT drove the broker's retained will and the service
flipped the device offline; telemetry landed in SQLite; make mqtt-verify passed
13/13; the service connected over TLS with credentials and a CA.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 14:37:43 +11:00

150 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown

# Phase 3 MQTT security for the shared Mosquitto
This directory holds the **broker-side** half of Phase 3 (AGENTS.md §11, §10
rule 6; `TRANSPORT_DESIGN.md` "Security"). The Go half lives in
`internal/mqtt/`.
The transport itself — retained config per device, status and telemetry
subscriptions, LWT presence — is implemented and running against the shared
Mosquitto on `.13:1883`. What follows is the credential and TLS layer that
onboards the kids' devices.
## What is here
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
| `conf.d/webrestrict.conf` | the TLS listener on 8883 with authentication |
| `conf.d/webrestrict.acl` | the topic ACL: one device, one topic set |
| `conf.d/webrestrict.passwd` | **generated** hashed accounts (gitignored) |
| `generate-tls.sh` | builds the lab CA and the broker certificate |
| `build-config.sh` | writes the scratch broker config used by the verifier |
| `provision-clients.sh` | creates one broker account per registered device |
| `verify-isolation.sh` | proves the ACL on a throwaway broker |
| `clients.env` | **generated** device credentials (gitignored) |
## The design
Two listeners on the one broker. No second broker (§10 rule 6), no router
change, no DNS change.
| Listener | Auth | Who uses it |
|---|---|---|
| `1883` (existing, unchanged) | anonymous | n8n and the rest of the lab |
| `8883` (new, TLS) | required account | the kids' devices and the Control Service |
`per_listener_settings true` is what keeps the two planes apart: the plain
listener stays anonymous, the TLS listener requires credentials. It must appear
in the main `mosquitto.conf` **before the first `listener` line**.
### Topic ACL
```acl
user control-service
topic write restrict/+/config
topic read restrict/+/status
topic read restrict/+/telemetry
pattern read restrict/%u/config
pattern write restrict/%u/status
pattern write restrict/%u/telemetry
```
- Only the Control Service publishes config (§10 rule 5). It cannot read config
and cannot write status or telemetry.
- A device's MQTT username **is** its topic token — the middle level of its
config topic. For `restrict/harry_phone_2/config` the account is
`harry_phone_2`.
- `%u` expands to that username, so a device can only ever touch its own topics.
Adding a device is therefore one account, no ACL edit.
- A device publishing to its own config topic is dropped by the broker, so a
child cannot publish a fake "unlocked".
List the tokens the Control Service expects:
```bash
docker exec webrestrict-control /app/control mqtt-clients
```
## Prove it without touching anything shared
```bash
make mqtt-verify # TLS + CA + scratch broker on 127.0.0.1:18883
```
`verify-isolation.sh` stages a throwaway copy of the config, runs its own
Mosquitto container on a spare port, and asserts the whole policy: the plain
listener is still anonymous, the TLS listener rejects anonymous clients and a
wrong password, a device reads only its own config, writes only its own status
and telemetry, cannot write another device's topics, and **cannot overwrite its
own config to fake an unlock**.
## Why this is not applied to the shared broker yet
Applying it changes files outside this project (`mosquitto.conf` and the
Mosquitto `docker-compose.yml`), adds port 8883 to a family-facing service, and
restarts that service. The Phase 3 guardrail is explicit: *do not change the
shared Mosquitto config.* So the change is prepared, generated and verified —
**not applied**. Applying it is a one-command step after Sam approves it, and is
tracked as the follow-up on AUD-80.
## Applying it (after approval)
Everything below is additive. Nothing existing is rewritten except the three
lines in step 2, and a backup is taken first.
```bash
# 1. Credentials and certificates.
docker exec webrestrict-control /app/control mqtt-clients # tokens, no secrets
deploy/mosquitto/provision-clients.sh # writes conf.d/webrestrict.passwd + clients.env
make mqtt-tls # writes tls/{ca,server}.{crt,key}
# 2. Copy the material into the shared broker's config directory.
BROKER_DIR=/home/sam/Docker/Containers/mosquitto
sudo -u sam cp "$BROKER_DIR/mosquitto.conf" \
"$BROKER_DIR/mosquitto.conf.bak.$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
install -d -m 755 "$BROKER_DIR/conf.d" "$BROKER_DIR/tls"
install -m 644 deploy/mosquitto/conf.d/webrestrict.conf "$BROKER_DIR/conf.d/"
install -m 644 deploy/mosquitto/conf.d/webrestrict.acl "$BROKER_DIR/conf.d/"
install -m 644 deploy/mosquitto/conf.d/webrestrict.passwd "$BROKER_DIR/conf.d/"
install -m 644 deploy/mosquitto/tls/* "$BROKER_DIR/tls/"
# then add these three lines to mosquitto.conf:
# per_listener_settings true (before the first listener)
# include_dir /mosquitto/config/conf.d
# (leave `listener 1883 0.0.0.0` and `allow_anonymous true` exactly as they are)
# 3. Publish 8883 and restart, bounded.
# add - "8883:8883" to the mosquitto service ports in
# $BROKER_DIR/docker-compose.yml, then:
cd "$BROKER_DIR"
timeout 120 docker compose up -d
timeout 30 docker logs --tail 20 mosquitto # expect both listeners to open
# 4. Prove the plain plane still works (n8n depends on it).
timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host --entrypoint sh eclipse-mosquitto:latest -c \
'mosquitto_sub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -t lab/after -C 1 -W 10 & sleep 1; \
mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -t lab/after -m ok; wait'
# 5. Point the Control Service at TLS.
# environment.d/control-service.env:
# CONTROL_MQTT_BROKER=tls://host.docker.internal:8883
# CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE=false
# CONTROL_MQTT_USERNAME=control-service
# CONTROL_MQTT_PASSWORD=<from clients.env>
timeout 120 docker compose up -d --build
timeout 30 docker logs --tail 30 webrestrict-control # expect "mqtt connected" over tls
```
### Roll back
```bash
cd /home/sam/Docker/Containers/mosquitto
cp mosquitto.conf.bak.<timestamp> mosquitto.conf
rm -rf conf.d tls
# remove the "8883:8883" port line from docker-compose.yml
timeout 120 docker compose up -d
```
Rolling back the broker needs no change in this project: set
`CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE=true` and `CONTROL_MQTT_BROKER=tcp://host.docker.internal:1883`
in `environment.d/control-service.env` and restart the service.