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ai-resume/content/ai/l3/ai-guardrails.md
Documenter 00fa15f98f Phase 1: content source of truth — 40 documents across six areas
Satisfies the Phase 1 Definition of Done:

- content/ validates cleanly against the frozen schema. `make validate`
  reports OK: 40 document(s) validated, 0 violations.
- Six areas exist, each with an L1 entry: ai-overview, platform-overview,
  edge-overview, products-overview, history-overview, about-overview.
- All six areas have an L2 entry: ai-systems, platform-estate, edge-fleet,
  products-business, history-engagements, about-narrative.
- 28 L3 artefact stubs under content/<area>/l3/. Every artefacts[].url in
  every document resolves to one of them; the validator proves there are no
  dangling references (and a deliberately broken copy exits 1).
- Every metric value traces to a source line in the evidence notes or the
  approved metric set in reference/content-map.md (per-metric citations are
  recorded in the AUD-131 completion comment).
- Every document carries confidence and last_verified=2026-10-26; the
  validator rejects a missing or non-canonical value.
- docs/content-redaction.md records the redaction pass: identifiers, third
  party personal data, credentials and infrastructure detail excluded, with
  reasons, plus the two numbers that are reported rather than smoothed.

Honesty positions held: 3 businesses active (12 adoptions over time),
Where-Woof deployed and pre-market, failures kept in (edge-failures), no
promotion of in-progress work to delivered.

No site code, no templates, no CSS, no rendering (Phase 2).
2026-10-26 17:30:35 +11:00

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---
id: ai-guardrails
area: ai
level: 3
title: "Artefact — Guardrails · hooks in the model path"
claim: "Injection blocking and constrained tool use are code in the model path — built because the house voice channel is shared and unauthenticated."
confidence: running
period: "2020–"
tech: [OmniRoute, Python]
metrics: [{label: "tools exposed by the public assistant", value: 0}]
artefacts: []
public: true
last_verified: 2026-10-26
tags: [ai, guardrails, security, artefact]
---
# Artefact — Guardrails · hooks in the model path
**Status: stub.** A redacted injection-test result lands in Phase 6, when the guardrail library is wired into this site's own assistant.
## What the artefact is
The hooks that run before a request reaches a provider and before a response reaches an actuator: injection patterns are blocked, tool use is constrained to a declared set, and consequential actions stop at an approval gate. Behind them, one rule that outranks every prompt — no model sits in the path of a fast or dangerous command.
## What it proves
Safety enforced by mechanism. A prompt instruction is a suggestion; a hook is a control.
## When it is delivered
The test result in Phase 6, using the same library the house runs. The policy that the public assistant has no tools at all is a Phase 5 and 6 decision and is not negotiable at runtime.