Satisfies the Phase 1 Definition of Done: - content/ validates cleanly against the frozen schema. `make validate` reports OK: 40 document(s) validated, 0 violations. - Six areas exist, each with an L1 entry: ai-overview, platform-overview, edge-overview, products-overview, history-overview, about-overview. - All six areas have an L2 entry: ai-systems, platform-estate, edge-fleet, products-business, history-engagements, about-narrative. - 28 L3 artefact stubs under content/<area>/l3/. Every artefacts[].url in every document resolves to one of them; the validator proves there are no dangling references (and a deliberately broken copy exits 1). - Every metric value traces to a source line in the evidence notes or the approved metric set in reference/content-map.md (per-metric citations are recorded in the AUD-131 completion comment). - Every document carries confidence and last_verified=2026-10-26; the validator rejects a missing or non-canonical value. - docs/content-redaction.md records the redaction pass: identifiers, third party personal data, credentials and infrastructure detail excluded, with reasons, plus the two numbers that are reported rather than smoothed. Honesty positions held: 3 businesses active (12 adoptions over time), Where-Woof deployed and pre-market, failures kept in (edge-failures), no promotion of in-progress work to delivered. No site code, no templates, no CSS, no rendering (Phase 2).
32 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: ai-guardrails
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area: ai
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level: 3
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title: "Artefact — Guardrails · hooks in the model path"
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claim: "Injection blocking and constrained tool use are code in the model path — built because the house voice channel is shared and unauthenticated."
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confidence: running
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period: "2020–"
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tech: [OmniRoute, Python]
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metrics: [{label: "tools exposed by the public assistant", value: 0}]
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artefacts: []
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public: true
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last_verified: 2026-10-26
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tags: [ai, guardrails, security, artefact]
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---
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# Artefact — Guardrails · hooks in the model path
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**Status: stub.** A redacted injection-test result lands in Phase 6, when the guardrail library is wired into this site's own assistant.
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## What the artefact is
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The hooks that run before a request reaches a provider and before a response reaches an actuator: injection patterns are blocked, tool use is constrained to a declared set, and consequential actions stop at an approval gate. Behind them, one rule that outranks every prompt — no model sits in the path of a fast or dangerous command.
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## What it proves
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Safety enforced by mechanism. A prompt instruction is a suggestion; a hook is a control.
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## When it is delivered
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The test result in Phase 6, using the same library the house runs. The policy that the public assistant has no tools at all is a Phase 5 and 6 decision and is not negotiable at runtime.
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