Add 5 pi extensions: pi-subagents, pi-crew, rpiv-pi, pi-interactive-shell, pi-intercom
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name: secure-agent-orchestration-review
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description: Use when reviewing delegation, skill loading, tool access, worker prompts, artifacts, runtime config, state, ownership, or subprocess execution.
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---
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# secure-agent-orchestration-review
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Core principle: every delegated worker crosses trust boundaries. Safe orchestration requires contained paths, explicit ownership, scoped tools, non-invasive defaults, and prompt-injection resistance.
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Distilled from detailed reads of security notice, insecure-defaults, sharp-edges, differential-review, guardrail, and skill quality patterns.
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## Trust Boundaries
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Review:
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- parent session ↔ child Pi worker;
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- user prompt ↔ generated task packet;
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- project skills ↔ package skills;
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- global config ↔ project config;
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- artifacts/logs ↔ future prompts/UI;
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- mailbox/respond/steer/cancel ↔ session ownership;
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- external skills/docs ↔ prompt injection/tool poisoning;
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- runtime env/CLI args ↔ provider/model behavior.
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## Must-Check Findings
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- Unsafe defaults: scaffold mode unexpectedly enabled, dangerous limits, missing depth guards, overbroad tools.
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- Path containment: cwd override escape, symlink traversal, unsafe skill names, absolute path leakage.
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- Prompt injection: untrusted output treated as instruction, skill metadata overtrusted, missing precedence text.
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- Secrets: env/config/log/artifact/diagnostic leakage.
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- Destructive commands: delete/prune/reset/force push without explicit confirmation.
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- Ownership races: authorization checked outside lock, stale task/manifest written after re-read.
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- Supply chain: external skill content imported without review, unknown tool requirements, hidden commands.
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## Secure Defaults for pi-crew
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- Real execution should be explicit and disable-able, but generated config must not accidentally block normal workflows.
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- Project overrides should be contained to the project root.
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- Missing/invalid config should fall back safely.
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- Skills should be loaded by safe name and source-labeled without absolute path disclosure.
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- Worker prompts should state instruction precedence and treat artifacts as data.
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## Finding Format
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Include severity, path/symbol, scenario, fix, and verification. Separate must-fix security issues from hardening suggestions.
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