#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Prove the Phase 3 MQTT security design on a throwaway broker.
#
# This script NEVER touches the shared Mosquitto on `.13`. It builds a scratch
# configuration with the same shape as the proposed shared change, runs it in its
# own container on a spare port, and asserts the policy in
# conf.d/webrestrict.acl:
#
#   * the plain listener is still anonymous, so n8n and the lab keep working;
#   * the TLS listener refuses anonymous clients and a wrong password;
#   * a device can read only its own config;
#   * a device can write only its own status and telemetry;
#   * a device cannot fake an unlock by publishing to its own config topic.
#
# Usage:  make mqtt-verify
#   MQTT_VERIFY_PORT  host port for the TLS listener  (default 18883)

set -euo pipefail

here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
broker_image="${MQTT_IMAGE:-eclipse-mosquitto:latest}"
tls_port="${MQTT_VERIFY_PORT:-18883}"
plain_port=$((tls_port + 1))
name="webrestrict-mqtt-verify"
service_user="control-service"
# A throwaway password. head reads a fixed number of bytes from the device and
# cut consumes its whole input, so no stage of this pipeline is signalled with
# SIGPIPE (which `set -o pipefail` would turn into a failure).
rand_pass() { head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '/+=' | cut -c1-32; }
service_pass="$(rand_pass)"
dev_a_pass="$(rand_pass)"
dev_b_pass="$(rand_pass)"

work="$(mktemp -d)"
chmod 755 "$work"
cleanup() {
  timeout 30 docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  rm -rf "$work"
}
trap cleanup EXIT

pass=0
fail=0
ok() {
  echo "  PASS  $1"
  pass=$((pass + 1))
}
no() {
  echo "  FAIL  $1"
  fail=$((fail + 1))
}

die() {
  echo "mqtt-verify: $*" >&2
  exit 1
}

command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker is not available"

[[ -s "$here/conf.d/webrestrict.conf" ]] || die "run build-config.sh first (make mqtt-config)"
[[ -s "$here/tls/ca.crt" ]] || die "no CA; run generate-tls.sh first (make mqtt-tls)"

# --- stage a throwaway config root -----------------------------------------
echo "mqtt-verify: staging a scratch config in $work"
mkdir -p "$work/build" "$work/conf.d" "$work/tls"
cp "$here/conf.d/webrestrict.conf" "$work/conf.d/"
cp "$here/conf.d/webrestrict.acl" "$work/conf.d/"
cp "$here/tls/ca.crt" "$here/tls/server.crt" "$here/tls/server.key" "$work/tls/"
if [[ -s "$here/build/mosquitto.conf" ]]; then
  cp "$here/build/mosquitto.conf" "$work/build/"
else
  "$here/build-config.sh" >/dev/null
  cp "$here/build/mosquitto.conf" "$work/build/"
fi

# Throwaway accounts, generated with the broker's own tool. mosquitto_passwd
# refuses to overwrite an existing file, so only the first account creates it.
rm -f "$work/conf.d/webrestrict.passwd"
for pair in "$service_user:$service_pass" "testdev_a:$dev_a_pass" "testdev_b:$dev_b_pass"; do
  user="${pair%%:*}"
  secret="${pair#*:}"
  args=(-b)
  [[ -s "$work/conf.d/webrestrict.passwd" ]] || args+=(-c)
  timeout 60 docker run --rm --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
    -v "$work/conf.d":/cfg --entrypoint mosquitto_passwd "$broker_image" \
    "${args[@]}" /cfg/webrestrict.passwd "$user" "$secret" >/dev/null ||
    die "mosquitto_passwd failed"
done
chmod -R a+rX "$work"

# --- run the scratch broker -------------------------------------------------
timeout 30 docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
echo "mqtt-verify: starting $name (tls :$tls_port -> 8883, plain :$plain_port -> 1883)"
timeout 60 docker run -d --name "$name" \
  -v "$work":/mosquitto/config:ro \
  -p "127.0.0.1:$tls_port:8883" -p "127.0.0.1:$plain_port:1883" \
  "$broker_image" /usr/sbin/mosquitto -c /mosquitto/config/build/mosquitto.conf >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 40); do
  if timeout 10 docker logs "$name" 2>&1 | grep -c 'mosquitto version .* running' >/dev/null; then break; fi
  sleep 0.5
done
sleep 1
if [[ "$(timeout 20 docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$name")" != "true" ]]; then
  timeout 20 docker logs "$name" 2>&1 | tail -20
  die "the scratch broker did not stay up (see its log above)"
fi

# --- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------
# mosquitto_pub/sub run in a client container that shares the host network.
pub() { # user pass topic payload [retain]
  local retain=""
  [[ -n "${5:-}" ]] && retain="-r"
  timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host -v "$work":/work:ro \
    --entrypoint mosquitto_pub "$broker_image" \
    -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$tls_port" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
    -u "$1" -P "$2" -t "$3" -m "$4" $retain 2>&1
}

# read retains everything published to the topic; prints what it got, or "" on
# timeout.
read_topic() { # user pass topic wait_secs
  timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host -v "$work":/work:ro \
    --entrypoint mosquitto_sub "$broker_image" \
    -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$tls_port" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
    -u "$1" -P "$2" -t "$3" -C 1 -W "$4" 2>/dev/null || true
}

# roundtrip publishes as one account and reads as another, so a write permission
# and a read permission are both exercised. It prints what the reader received,
# or nothing.
roundtrip() { # pub_user pub_pass sub_user sub_pass topic payload
  timeout 60 docker run --rm --network host -e PORT="$tls_port" -v "$work":/work:ro \
    --entrypoint sh "$broker_image" -c '
      mosquitto_sub -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$PORT" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
        -u "$1" -P "$2" -t "$3" -C 1 -W 10 >/tmp/out 2>/dev/null &
      s=$!; sleep 1
      mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$PORT" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
        -u "$4" -P "$5" -t "$3" -m "$6" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
      wait $s; cat /tmp/out' \
    sh "$3" "$4" "$5" "$1" "$2" "$6" 2>/dev/null || true
}

echo
echo "== 1. the plain listener is unchanged (the lab keeps working) =="
plain="$(timeout 60 docker run --rm --network host --entrypoint sh "$broker_image" -c '
  mosquitto_sub -h 127.0.0.1 -p '"$plain_port"' -t lab/verify -C 1 -W 10 >/tmp/out 2>&1 &
  s=$!; sleep 1
  mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p '"$plain_port"' -t lab/verify -m plain-plane-ok >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  wait $s; cat /tmp/out' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [[ "$plain" == "plain-plane-ok" ]]; then
  ok "anonymous client on the plain listener can publish and subscribe"
else
  no "anonymous client on the plain listener was blocked (got '$plain')"
fi

echo
echo "== 2. the TLS listener rejects what it should =="
if timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host --entrypoint mosquitto_pub "$broker_image" \
  -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$tls_port" -t restrict/testdev_a/config -m nope >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  no "a plain TCP client was accepted on the TLS port"
else
  ok "a plain TCP client is rejected on the TLS port (TLS really is on)"
fi

if timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host -v "$work":/work:ro --entrypoint mosquitto_pub "$broker_image" \
  -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$tls_port" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
  -t restrict/testdev_a/config -m nope >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  no "an anonymous client was accepted over TLS"
else
  ok "an anonymous client is refused over TLS"
fi

if timeout 40 docker run --rm --network host -v "$work":/work:ro --entrypoint mosquitto_pub "$broker_image" \
  -h 127.0.0.1 -p "$tls_port" --cafile /work/tls/ca.crt \
  -u testdev_a -P wrong-password -t restrict/testdev_a/status -m nope >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  no "a wrong password was accepted"
else
  ok "a wrong password is refused"
fi

echo
echo "== 3. one device is confined to its own topics =="
payload='{"v":1,"locked":true,"src":"control"}'
if pub "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_a/config "$payload" retain >/dev/null; then
  ok "the Control Service can publish retained config"
else
  no "the Control Service could not publish config"
fi

got="$(read_topic testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" restrict/testdev_a/config 5)"
if [[ "$got" == "$payload" ]]; then
  ok "a device reads its own retained config"
else
  no "a device did not read its own config (got '$got')"
fi

got="$(read_topic testdev_b "$dev_b_pass" restrict/testdev_a/config 4)"
if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
  ok "a device cannot read another device's config"
else
  no "a device read another device's config (got '$got')"
fi

got="$(roundtrip testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_a/status '{"online":true}')"
if [[ "$got" == '{"online":true}' ]]; then
  ok "a device writes its own status and the Control Service reads it"
else
  no "a device's own status did not arrive (got '$got')"
fi

got="$(roundtrip testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_a/telemetry '{"app":"com.spotify.music","seconds":60}')"
if [[ "$got" == *com.spotify.music* ]]; then
  ok "a device writes its own telemetry and the Control Service reads it"
else
  no "a device's own telemetry did not arrive (got '$got')"
fi

got="$(roundtrip testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_b/status '{"online":true}')"
if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
  ok "a device cannot write another device's status"
else
  no "a device wrote another device's status (got '$got')"
fi

got="$(roundtrip testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_b/telemetry '{"app":"x","seconds":1}')"
if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
  ok "a device cannot write another device's telemetry"
else
  no "a device wrote another device's telemetry (got '$got')"
fi

echo
echo "== 4. a device cannot fake an unlock =="
pub testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" restrict/testdev_a/config '{"v":1,"locked":false,"src":"device"}' retain >/dev/null || true
got="$(read_topic testdev_a "$dev_a_pass" restrict/testdev_a/config 5)"
if [[ "$got" == "$payload" ]]; then
  ok "a device's publish to its own config topic was ignored (still $payload)"
else
  no "a device overwrote its own config (got '$got')"
fi

echo
echo "== 5. the Control Service cannot be spoofed either =="
echo
got="$(roundtrip "$service_user" "$service_pass" "$service_user" "$service_pass" restrict/testdev_a/status '{"online":false}')"
if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
  ok "the Control Service identity cannot publish status (read-only there)"
else
  no "the Control Service identity published status (got '$got')"
fi

echo
echo "mqtt-verify: $pass passed, $fail failed"
[[ $fail -eq 0 ]] || exit 1