Phase 8: overrides (shared keycode + versioned admin lock/unlock/grant API)
Build on Phases 1–7. Adds the two override paths from AGENTS.md §4 FR-10/FR-11: the shared device keycode and the versioned admin HTTP API the separate Kotlin admin app will call. - store: migration 004 adds state.grant_until and a settings table. New overrides.go records every override in `overrides` and verifies the shared keycode (bcrypt; one code for every device, §10 rule 3). ExpireLocks also clears an expired grant, and NextScheduleBoundary includes the grant end so a device re-locks on time. - effective state: a grant unlocks a device inside a schedule window; a manual lock clears a grant and a grant clears a manual lock. The retained config payload gains grant_until (additive, v stays 1). - web: /api/v1/admin/... (list, state, lock, unlock, grant) guarded by CONTROL_ADMIN_API_TOKEN, separate from the session login, plus the on-device keycode endpoint POST /api/v1/device/override with per-address throttling. A state change is published retained before the API responds. - cmd/control: `keycode` subcommand and start-up seeding from CONTROL_DEVICE_KEYCODE_HASH. - deploy/verify-phase8.sh + `make verify-phase8` prove the definition of done: an API lock reaches a real broker subscriber in well under a second. - Version 0.6.0-phase8 (compose, Makefile, docs). Measured on .13: the lock reached the TLS broker subscriber in 7 ms (handler 1 ms, request to retained publish accepted). Tests: go vet ./... and go test -count=1 ./... pass in golang:1.25-alpine. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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@@ -38,9 +38,25 @@ CONTROL_ADMIN_USERNAME=sam
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CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
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# Option B (preferred): a bcrypt hash; leave CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD empty.
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# Generate: docker run --rm --entrypoint /app/control webrestrict/control:0.5.0-phase7 hash-password 'your-password'
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# Generate: docker run --rm --entrypoint /app/control webrestrict/control:0.6.0-phase8 hash-password 'your-password'
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# CONTROL_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH=$2a$10$...
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# --- Admin API (Phase 8) ---------------------------------------------------
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# The versioned HTTP API the separate Kotlin admin app (kotlin_phone_app_admin)
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# calls directly. Its bearer token is SEPARATE from the dashboard session login.
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# Generate a long random value: openssl rand -hex 32
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# When empty the API answers 503 "admin API is not configured" and nothing else
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# changes, so an older deployment keeps working.
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CONTROL_ADMIN_API_TOKEN=change-me-to-a-long-random-token
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# The shared device keycode (one code, every device — AGENTS.md §10 rule 3).
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# Give a bcrypt hash, never the code itself. Generate one with:
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# docker run --rm --entrypoint /app/control webrestrict/control:0.6.0-phase8 \
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# hash-password 'the-code'
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# The hash is seeded into SQLite at start-up and can be changed later with
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# `docker exec webrestrict-control /app/control keycode`.
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# CONTROL_DEVICE_KEYCODE_HASH=$2a$10$...
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# --- MQTT (Phase 3) --------------------------------------------------------
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# The broker is transport only. SQLite stays the source of truth, and only the
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# Control Service publishes config (AGENTS.md §10 rules 5-6).
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