Phase 3: MQTT transport — retained config, status/telemetry, LWT presence, TLS/ACL design
- internal/mqtt: publish each device's desired state retained on restrict/<device>/config; subscribe to restrict/+/status and restrict/+/telemetry and write reports to SQLite; publish on every state change, republish on connect and every 15 minutes from SQLite, so the broker is repaired from the source of truth. - store: presence (devices.online and last_seen, audited only on transitions), telemetry upsert per (device, day, app, domain) via migration 002, allow and block lists read into the config payload, device lookup by topic. - config: MQTT settings. TLS plus per-device credentials are required; the pre-TLS shared broker needs an explicit CONTROL_MQTT_INSECURE escape hatch. - web: republish config after lock, unlock, expiry, create and edit; broker card on the status partial. - deploy/mosquitto: TLS listener, topic ACL, credential provisioning and a verifier that proves the policy on a throwaway broker. Not applied to the shared Mosquitto on .13 — that change needs Sam's approval. - cmd/control: mqtt-clients prints the MQTT identity of every device. - paho.mqtt.golang v1.5.1, which pulls golang.org/x/net and with it the golang.org/x/crypto bump to v0.42.0. Verified on .13: retained config delivered to a fresh subscriber; a client killed without DISCONNECT drove the broker's retained will and the service flipped the device offline; telemetry landed in SQLite; make mqtt-verify passed 13/13; the service connected over TLS with credentials and a CA. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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deploy/mosquitto/conf.d/webrestrict.conf
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deploy/mosquitto/conf.d/webrestrict.conf
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# Per-device MQTT security for the Internet Use Control Control Service.
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#
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# APPLY WITH deploy/mosquitto/README.md. This fragment is included by the shared
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# Mosquitto on `.13`; it does not replace its configuration (AGENTS.md §11
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# Phase 3, §10 rule 6).
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#
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# Two listeners, two planes:
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# * 1883 stays exactly as it is — plain, anonymous. n8n and the rest of the
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# lab keep working (N8N_DEFAULT_MQTT_BROKER_URL=mqtt://192.168.20.13:1883).
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# * 8883 is new and is the ONLY listener the kids' devices use: TLS, a
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# required account, and a topic ACL.
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#
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# `per_listener_settings true` belongs in the main mosquitto.conf, before the
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# first listener, not here. It is what keeps the 1883 plane anonymous while the
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# 8883 plane requires credentials.
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listener 8883 0.0.0.0
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# No anonymous devices. A device reads only its own config and writes only its
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# own status and telemetry (webrestrict.acl).
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allow_anonymous false
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password_file /mosquitto/config/conf.d/webrestrict.passwd
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acl_file /mosquitto/config/conf.d/webrestrict.acl
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# TLS. The lab CA is generated by generate-tls.sh; every device and the Control
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# Service trust the same CA, so a rogue broker on the LAN cannot hand a device
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# its rules.
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tls_version tlsv1.2
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cafile /mosquitto/config/tls/ca.crt
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certfile /mosquitto/config/tls/server.crt
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keyfile /mosquitto/config/tls/server.key
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# A device proves who it is with a password; it does not need its own client
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# certificate.
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require_certificate false
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